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His antagonism to certain branches of statistics on logical grounds, so evident in 
Statistical Theory, is here undiminished and still lacking in persuasiveness-though not 
in interest-to one reader. 
The book concludes with two papers about what we might call the New Atuhori- 
tarianism within science: the willingness to accept the pundit's views, to be a disciple, 
to join the Atom Smashing Establishment. Science is founded on and pays homage to 
original thought and independence of mind-but it is quite possible that scientists 
exhibit it less than non-scientists, proportionately speaking. An intelligent man who is 
a citizen is not necessarily an intelligent citizen. There is a discussion in the last chapter 
which illustrates this, on the impossibility of regarding socialism or free enterprise as 
per se desirable without referring to the size, resources, and sophistication of the social 
unit involved. It is a point of modest difficulty, not original but rare in our contemporaries 
scientist or not, and crucially important for our thinking and our survival. We are indeed 
a scientific society, as the nineteenth-century was an industrial one; but also a stupid 
society. We need more Hogbens. Michael Scriven, Indiana University. 
PETER MADISON. Freuds concept of repression and defense, its theoretical and observational 
language. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961. 205 pp. $4.75. 
Although psychoanalysis is over sixty years old, its many critics have correctly pointed 
out that its scientific status is by no means established. Two problems immediately 
arise (a) What precisely is wrong with psychoanalysis from a scientific standpoint? 
(b) What can be done about it? 
The first question was answered clearly and unambiguously by Professor Ernest Nagel 
at a New York conference of philosophers and psychoanalysts:' Psychoanalysis lacks a 
clearly formulated observational language and rules of interpretation that link the 
observational language to its complex and highly metaphorical theoretical language. 
Without this observational language and rules of interpretation for the theoretical lan- 
guage, psychoanalysis remains no more than speculative metaphysics-incapable of 
empirical disconfirmation and always capable of being saved by numerous ad hoc 
assumptions in the light of prima facie conflicting evidence. 
The answer to the second question, although not explicitly given by Nagel, seems to 
follow as a matter of course from his answer to the first question: Reformulate psycho- 
analysis in such a way that it has a clearly formulated observational language and rules 
of interpretation, and then begin verification studies. 
Philosophers of science who have argued as Nagel has might pause to answer an impor- 
tant question: HFow can one actually establish that psychoanalysis does, in fact, lack a 
clearly formulated observational language and rules of interpretation ? 
One method of determining if Nagel is correct might involve some sort of empirical 
investigation of the behavior of psychoanalysts. One might, for example, question psycho- 
analysts and see if they can specify what evidence would count against their theory. 
This method, to my knowledge, has never been attempted in any systematic or extensive 
manner although unsystematic questioning of a few psychoanalysts by Professor Hook2 
seems to confirm the suspicions of Professor Nagel. 
For those of us who do not have psychoanalysts readily available for questioning, 
another approach is feasible: We can read psychoanalytic literature carefully in an effort 
to determine the empirical content (if any) of the theory. This approach has been at- 
tempted for the first time in a detailed and systematic way by Peter Madison in Freud's 
Concept of Repression and Defense, Its Theoretical and Observational Language. 
I Ernest Nagel, "Methodological Issues in Psychoanalytic Theory," Psychoanalysis, Scientific 
Method and Philosophy, ed. S. Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1959), pp. 38-56. 
2 Sidney Hook, "Science and Mythology in Psychoanalysis," Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, 
and Philosophy, ed. S. Hook, (New York: New York University Press, 1959), pp. 212-223. 
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Madison, by a careful and scholarly examination of Freud's writing, has attempted 
to separate the theoretical language of psychoanalysis from the language used to report 
the overt behavior of patients and has tried to extract rules of interpretation from the 
context of the uses of the two languages. It should be clear that the results of his study 
are of the greatest importance to anyone interested in the scientific status of psycho- 
analysis. His results can be summarized as follows: 
(a) For many major aspects of psychoanalysis no observational language is available. 
For example, Madison could find no observational language in Freud's writing describing 
the behavior of infants undergoing the hidden workings of primal repression or the 
behavior of children undergoing a castration trauma. Madison argues that indirect 
verification of these hypotheses e.g., by verbal reports within the clinical situation, is 
illegitimate (p. 178). Madison concludes that because indirect verification is illegitimate 
and direct verification is impossible verification of these aspects of psychoanalysis is 
impossible. 
(b) For other aspects of psychoanalysis an observational language is available in 
Freud's writings. For instance, for the process of resistance Madison discovered a 
number of behavioral symptoms specified in Freud's clinical writings e.g., periods of 
silence in the therapeutic session. On the basis of these symptoms Madison suggests 
certain techniques for measuring resistance. 
In summary, Madison would have us believe that certain aspects of psychoanalysis 
are not confirmable while other aspects are not only confirmable but are even measurable. 
A close examination of the evidence Madison cites reveals, however, that such conclu- 
sions are unwarranted. 
(a) In the first place it should be noted that Madison is mistaken in inferring on the 
grounds that he does that indirect confirmation by clinical evidence e.g., verbal reports, 
is illegitimate. He argues that the clinical evidence would always need interpretation by 
means of Freudian assumptions, hence it cannot be used for validating Freudian assump- 
tions. Thus someone's reported fear of being bitten by a horse cannot be taken as con- 
firming the existence of a childhood castration trauma, Madison argues, because the 
theoretical assumption underlying the castration complex is that fear of being bitten = 
fear of being castrated. But it is no objection that this indirect method of verification 
uses theoretical assumptions (for example, that fear of being bitten = fear of being 
castrated). Surely it is necessary only that these theoretical assumptions are confirmed 
by evidence (for example, verbal behavior) that is independent of the evidence inter- 
preted by these assumptions. The problem with this indirect clinical method of verifica- 
tion is not, therefore, what Madison suggests. 
There are other problems, however, with this method which Madison fails to mention. 
(i) From Freud's writing it is very unclear just what this independent clinical evidence 
might be. So whether these theoretical assumptions are confirmed or even confirmable 
is uncertain. 
(ii) Even if we knew precisely what sort of clinical evidence validated the theoretical 
assumptions, we would have to be extremely wary of any validation they might receive 
in the clinical setting, for recent experimental studies suggest that the whole process 
of clinical validation is suspect.3 These studies -both from learning theory and the 
social psychology of persuasion-indicate that psychoanalysts are very probably unwit- 
tingly influencing their patients to produce evidence that speciously confirms their 
theory. In the light of this experimental evidence it is hardly surprising that psychoana- 
lysis is "confirmed" in the psychoanalytic session by the verbal behavior of patients. 
(b) Madison is also incorrect in concluding that the observation language suggested 
in Freud's writing permits certain aspects of psychoanalysis to be confirmed or discon- 
firmed. 
3 See Michael Martin, "The Scientific Status of Psychoanalytic Clinical Evidence," Inquiry, 
1964. 
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(i) Whenever Freud does hint at the behavior on the basis of which hidden psychic 
processes e.g., resistance, are inferred his language is vague to the extreme. Freud's 
statements at best only suggest the path which a reformulation of psychoanalysis into 
testable hypotheses might take. For instance, Freud suggests that "periods of silence" 
in the clinical situation are behavioral symptoms of resistance. But what constitutes a 
"period of silence" ? A second ? A minute ? Madison suggests that the ratio of the 
patient's silence to non-silence in a 50 minute analytic session would be one measure 
of the amount of resistance manifested by a patient (p. 151). But it should be clear that 
Madison's suggestion would be a useful one only if we knew what part of an hour is 
spent in silence normally i.e., when there is supposed to be no resistance. Freud, as one 
might suppose, gives us no help in answering this question, and Freud's other statements 
about behavioral symptoms are even more sketchy and impressionistic. 
(ii) Madison does not always distinguish between his presentation of Freud's vague 
suggestions and his reformulation of them. For example, Madison's "silence ratio" 
is an improvement over Freud's vague suggestion about "periods of silence," yet it 
seems at times as if Madison is attributing the notion of a silence ratio to Freud. But it is 
not clear what Freud meant, hence it is not certain whether the notion of a silence ratio 
does measure what Freud intended. 
(iii) Freud does not tell us whether the absence of certain symptoms specified by 
Madison for, say, resistance indicates the absence of resistance. Nothing Freud says 
excludes the possibility of saying that a patient was resisting no matter what the evidence. 
In short, Freud's vague suggestions about behavioral symptoms do not warrant the 
conclusion that we have a hypothesis that could be disconfirmed. 
This does not mean, of course, that psychoanalytic theory cannot be given a clear 
empirical meaning and that it cannot be reformulated into a testable theory. 
Indeed, it is to be hoped that Madison's most interesting book will pave the way 
towards a testable reformulation of psychoanalytic theory. Because of Madison's work 
we should be clearer than ever before just where empirical consequences are lacking 
in psychoanalytic theory, where they are dimly suggested by Freud, and where reformu- 
lations might be fruitfully attempted. Despite my critical comments it should be clearer 
that Madison's book represents a pioneering effort-the first step towards a systematic 
reconstruction of psychoanalytic theory, a reconstruction that may eventually lead to its 
scientific acceptability. Michael Martin, University of Colorado. 
ALLAN M. MUNN. Free will and determinism. Toronto: University of Toronto 
press, 1960. 218 pp. 
This book does not contribute to the literature on the great problem its title suggests. 
The author is a philosophical amateur-nor would he, I hope, want us to think of him 
otherwise. Fortunately, most of the book is not about the relation of determinism and 
free will at all but merely a popular exposition of the "new physics," and as such 
takes its place in that genre of interesting books which attempt to explain the new 
conceptions of the mathematical physicists to the layman. Such books, e.g., Einstein and 
Infeld's Evolution of Physics, are usually interesting and informative and there is always 
room for one more of them. The challenge of rendering the original mathematical 
conception by simple prose and pictures is a never ending one for the ingenious writer. 
This book's chief contribution to this genre is that instead of complaining that he must 
omit mathematics (due to the reader's presumed abysmal shortcomings) Munn provides 
it handily available for us to peruse. This is done by the typographical device of parallel 
columns, one mathematical, the other prosaic, the latter serving as a commentary on what 
is going on in the former. The book is thus very useful for the person who has not quite 
enough mathematics to make a frontal attack on contemporary physics. 
Put forth in the last two chapters is Munn's main thesis-the part of the book which 
I find totally unsatisfactory. It is a version of a simple-minded view held by various 
people in the last few decades: this confuses free with indeterminacy, then goes on to 
